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THE MARYLAND COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL
DISABILITIES: WHITHER THOU GOEST?
Hon. Glenn T. Harrell, Jr.1

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL CON- called the California Commission on Judicial QualificaDUCT ORGANIZATIONS: WHERE DID THEY tions, had· express authority to receive and review
COME FROM?
complaints against judges, to conduct inquiries and
make investigations, and to dispense disciplinary recSpecialized judicial conduct organizations are a ommendations when necessary.12 Six states acted
relatively recent development. 2 The last three decades quickly to adopt the California prototype, making the
have witnessed the most intense and widespread public change between 1960 and 1966. Twenty-one acted
interest in the discipline ofjudges. 3 Scholars who have between 1967 and 1972 and twenty-one have acted
studied the issue point primarily to a combination of since 1973. \3 Today, forty-eight states and the District
two factors: (1) the increased scrutiny of public offi- ofColumbia have established similar agencies and make
cials, and (2) the public dissatisfaction with the tradi- recommendations for disposition. 14 About half the
tional common law procedures that were used to deal states have created commissions by constitutional
with judicial misconduct and disability. 4
amendment, the remainder have done so by court rule
The traditional method for dealing with judicial or the enactment of statutory provisions. 15
misconduct had been impeachment. 5 By 1960, howevSince California's creation of its Commission on
er, there was a feeling throughout the country that Judicial Qualifications, two forms of state judicial comimpeachment was "too tedious, too cumbersome, and missions have evolved: (1) the unitary commission, and
too expensive for frequent use" and no longer offered (2) the two-tier commission. 16 Most states have moda viable mechanism for judicial discipline. 6
eled their agencies after California's"unitary commisFurthermore, impeachment offered little procedur- sion." Unitary commissions are usually staffed by an
al protection for the judge, and the only remedy it executive director or executive secretary and serve as
provided was removal. A principal problem with permanent visible agencies with authority to receive and
impeachment proceedings is that they are conducted in review complaints against judges, conduct investigaa partisan atmosphere and tend to become politically tions, convene formal hearings, and make disciplinary
charged. Legislators may be motivated by factors other ·recommendations to the state's supreme court. 17
than the merits of the case. 7 As a result, legislators and
Some states instead have adopted a "two-tier"
citizens initiated impeachment only in cases offlagrant commission, whereby the investigative and adjudicamisconduct. 8 Most jurisdictions, therefore, employed tive functions are divided between two entities. 18 The
informal methods of discipline. 9 Informal tactics such commission receives and investigates complaints, and if
as peer pressure however, did not work with an obsti- there is probable cause that grounds exist for disciplinnate judge, and administrative or judicial actions such ary action or removal, the commission presents the
as reassignment or reversal might correct a judge for charges to a separate permanent board or court for the
minor episodes of misconduct, but could not affect the adjudicatory process. 19
manner of an incurable one. IO
B. Federal Courts
Federal courts also have adopted methods for regA. State Courts
In search of a better solution, California, in 1960, ulating judicial conduct. 20 Rather than specifically
became the first state t.o establish a permanent formal created and tenured commissions, the federal courts
system for regulating judicial conduct. II This agency, have relied on established agencies of the federal judi26.2/ U. Bait. L.F. - 3

cial administration to deal with alleged incapacity or
errant behavior on the part of their members. Two
statutorily created agencies share this responsibility:
(1) a national body, the Judicial Conference of the
United States,21 which is staffed by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, and (2) judicial
councils, which are responsible for the administration of
the eleven regional circuits.22
The rules of the Fourth Circuit's Judicial Council,
for example, state that upon receipt of a complaint
against a judge, the chief judge, upon reviewing the
complaint, will determine whether it should be: (1)
dismissed, (2) concluded on the ground that corrective
action has been taken, (3) concluded because intervening events have made action on the complaint no longer
necessary, or (4) referred to a special committee. If the
chief judge dismisses a complaint or concludes that no
further action is necessary, the complainant may petition for review to the judicial council. The judicial
council can then "affirm the order of the chief judge,
return the matter to the chiefjudge for further action, or,
in exceptional cases, take other appropriate relief. "23
II. THE MARYLAND COMMISSION ON ruDICIAL DISABILITIES
In 1966, Maryland became the fifth state to adopt a
judicial conduct commission. 24 Created by constitutional amendment,25 Maryland's Commission on Judicial Disabilities was modeled after California's unitary
commission. Prior to the creation of the Commission,
Maryland's methods ofdealing with disabled and errant
judges were typical of most states. Maryland's Constitution, art. IV, § 4, sets forth the constitutional methods
for the removal ofjudges. 26 In 1905, in Warfield v.
Vandiver,21 the Court ofAppeals concluded that art. IV,
§ 4 provided three ways to remove an incompetent or
disabled judge: (1) removal by the Governor, (2) impeachment under Md. Const. art. III, § 26, or (3) by
two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. With the
creation ofthe Commission on Judicial Disabilities, for
the first time in Maryland there was an alternative to
removal. 28

A. Duties, Powers andProcedures o/the Commission29
Either upon receipt of a verified statement or independently on its own motion, the Commission formerly
conducted a preliminary investigation that provided the
4 - U. Bait. L.F. 126.2

judge in question with notice and an opportunity to be
heard. Ifa majority of the Commissioners decided that
sufficient cause was present to warrant a formal hearing, notice of the hearing was given and within fifteen
days the judge could file an answer. At the recorded
hearing the judge had the right to introduce and compel
the production of evidence, be represented by counsel,
and cross-examine witnesses. If after a hearing, a
majority of eligible Commissioners found good cause,
the Commission issued a reprimand or recommended
censure, removal or other appropriate discipline or
retirement to the Court of Appeals. 30
The Commission's duties were clarified in two
subsequent amendments, first in 1970 and then again in
1974. The 1970 amendment gave the Commission the
power to administer oaths, subpoena witnesses, require
the production of evidence and grant immunity. 31 The
amendment also raised the membership ofthe Commission from five to seven. 32
The Commission normally meets monthly, though
it has met more frequently when required by the press
of business. Its seven members are appointed by the
Governor for four year terms. Members include four
judges presently serving on the bench, two members of
the bar admitted for at least fifteen years, and one lay
person representing the general public. 33 Although the
Commission's expenses are approved by the Chief
Judge of the Court ofY Appeals and paid out of the
judiciary budget, none of the Commission members
receives a salary. The Commission does not have a
discrete line item in the judiciary budget presently.
Maryland's Constitution does not set forth the
procedure to be used by the Commission in conducting
any investigation, but confers upon it "the power to
investigate complaints against any judge and provides
that the practice and procedure before the commission
shall be by rule promulgated by the Court ofAppeals."34
Maryland Rule 1227, adopted pursuant to Maryland's
Constitution, art. 40, § 45, detailed the procedures of
the Commission prior to July 1, 1995. The Commission's primary function was to receive and investigate
complaints against members of the Maryland judiciary.
Under Rule 1227, formal complaints to the Commission
were to have been in writing and notarized, but no
particular form was required. 35 Complaints were accepted from all sources-including members of the
public, state and local officials, attorneys, and from
judges themselves. In addition, the Commission could

initiate a preliminary investigation on its own motion. 36
The Commission handled the preliminary investigation of formal complaints in a variety of ways. Tapes
and transcripts of hearings were obtained. When necessary, attorneys and other disinterested parties who
participated in any proceedings in question were interviewed. On occasion, the Commission, as part of its
preliminary investigation, requested a judge to appear
before it. The Commission could investigate complaints through retained counsel, conduct hearings, or
take informal action as it deemed necessary, provided
the subject judge had been properly notified. Ifwarranted by the preliminary investigation, formal charges were
served upon the judge and a hearing was held regarding
the judge's alleged misconduct or disability.
The Court of Appeals has explained that proceedings before the Commission are neither criminal nor
civil in nature; "they are merely an inquiry into the
conduct of a judicial officer the aim of which is the
maintenance of the honor and dignity of the judiciary
and the proper administration ofjustice rather than the
punishment of the individual. "37 If as a result of the
hearing( s) the Commission, by a maj ority vote, decided
that a judge should be retired, removed, censured, or
publicly reprimanded, it recommended that course of
action to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
then could accept the Commission's recommendation
or order a more severe discipline of the judge than that
recommended. 38 In addition, the Commission had the
power in certain situations to issue private reprimands
or warnings.
Initially, all proceedings before the Commission
were confidential and privileged, except that a record
filed with the Court of Appeals lost its confidential
nature. 39 As authorized by the 1974 constitutional
amendment, however, the Court ofAppeals promulgated new rules that allowed the release of information
concerning Commission investigations, and permitting
the sealing of part or all of a proceeding filed with the
Court. 40
From July 1, 1993 to June 30, 1994, the Commission considered approximately forty-seven formal complaints, five of which were initiated by practicing attorneys and the remainder by members of the public. 41
Additionally, according to the immediate past Chair of
the Commission, there were thirty-two complaints during the 1994 calendar year that were summarily dismissed by the then Chair, after consultation with the

Executive Secretary, because they were facially beyond
the Commission's jurisdiction or patently failed to state
a claim of cognizable misconduct. Further, there were
an additional twenty complaints in 1994 that were
dismissed as being facially frivolous. 42
During the 1993-94 fiscal year reviewed in the
Report ofthe Judiciary,43 it was noted that some of the
forty-seven formal complaints considered were directed simultaneously against more than one judge. 44 In
several instances a single jurist was the subject of
multiple complaints. 45 In all, twenty-seven circuit court
judges, twelve district court judges, and two orphans'
court judges were the subject of complaints during
1993-94. 46 Four judges were requested to appear
before the Commission to defend charges against them. 47
Most of the complaints were disposed of by way of
discussion with the jurist involved or by a private
warning. 48 In most instances, however, complaints
were not serious enough to warrant personal appearances by judges. 49 The charges were dismissed either
because the accusations were unsubstantiated or not
supported by evidence following investigation, or because, in the Commission members' view, the conduct
did not amount to a breach ofjudicial ethics. 50 Litigation
over family law matters, including divorce, alimony,
and custody, precipitated some fourteen complaints;
criminal cases accounted for ten complaints and "the
remainder resulted from conventional civil litigation or
the alleged prejudice or improper demeanor of some
jurist. "51
In addition to formal complaints, numerous individuals either wrote or called the Commission's Executive
Secretary or its Chair expressing dissatisfaction concerning the outcome of a case or judicial ruling. Although many of these complaints were not technically
within the Commission's jurisdiction, the complainants
were afforded an opportunity to express their feelings
and frequently were informed, for the very first time, of
their right of appeal. Thus, the Commission offered an
additional service to members of the public. The
Commission also supplied judicial nominating commissions with confidential information concerning reprimands issued to, or pending charges against, those
judges seeking nomination to higher judicial offices. 52
B. Grounds for DiSCipline, Removal, and Retirement
Formal ethical standards are necessary parts of any
judicial disciplinary system. These standards help judg26.2/ U. Bait. L.F. - 5

es appraise their own conduct, provide rules that can be
enforced through the discipline and review procedures,
and touch on conduct which, "while not inherently
improper, should be restricted so as to prevent the
possibility or appearance of misconduct. "53
Currently, the Maryland Constitution provides for
judicial discipline in cases in which the Court ofAppeals
finds misconduct while in office, persistent failure to
perform duties required of the office, or conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. 54 The
ABA Code & Canons of Judicial Ethics and the ABA
Rules of Judicial Ethics provide guidelines for interpreting and construing these general provisions. The
Canons were adopted by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland and are binding on Maryland judges as part of
the Maryland Rules. 55 The Maryland State Bar Association formally endorsed the original Canons ofJudicial
Ethics in 1953. However, from 1953 untiltheMaryland
Judicial Conference adopted the Maryland Canons in
1970, the Canons served as mere recommendations.
The courts had not formally adopted them, nor were
there any enforceable procedures except through impeachment. Finally in 1970, the Judicial Conference
adopted the Canons. In 1971 it adopted even more
specific disciplinary rules that were set forth inMd. Rule
i 23 1.56 It was then that the Canons and disciplinary
rules of judicial ethics became formally imposed as
enforceable rules governing judges' conduct. 57
Md. Rule 1231 is composed of two parts. The
Canons of Judicial Ethics make-up the first part of the
Rule and consist of simple advisory statements. 58 The
second part of Rule 1231, the Rules of Judicial Ethics,
contains particular requirements and prohibitions which
use the mandatory word "shall," as opposed to the
Canons' permissive "should. "59 In addition, the Rules
of Judicial Ethics contain specific consequences for a
violation. 60
In several instances, the Commission on Judicial
Disabilities and the court of appeals have turned to the
ABA Canons and Rules of Judicial Conduct for guidance in deciding whether and how to discipline a judge. 61
However, attempting to define and apply ambiguous
phrases like "conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice" without some guidance from the .
ABA's model code and annotations is difficult.
In the Court of Appeals opinion, In re Foster,62 the
ABA Code ofJudicial Conduct was quoted favorably in
construing the phrase "conduct prejudicial to the prop6 - U. Bait. L.F. 126.2

er administration of justice. "63 Deciding to censure
Judge Foster, the Commission on Judicial Disabilities
found by clear and convincing evidence that Judge
Foster had utilized his office to persuade others to
contribute to the success of a private business venture. 64
The Court concluded that, since the establishment ofthe
Commission on Judicial Disabilities in 1966, it had been
possible to discipline a Maryland judge for "misconduct
while in office" or "conduct prejudicial to the proper
administration of justice" because objective standards
defining these terms were available in the ABA's Canons of Judicial Ethics. 65 Judge Foster was censured for
his active participation in a rezoning petition involving
land in another jurisdiction in which he held an option. 66
Although the Court found no actual wrongdoing, it held
that the judge's actions created the appearance of
improperly using the prestige of his judicial office to
achieve the desired result. 67
Since 1966, only three judges have been removed
from office as the result of an adjudication of judicial
misconduct. 68 In the first removal case, In Re Diener
and Broccolino,69 two district court judges were removed from office for conduct that occurred while they
were judges of the Traffic Division in Baltimore City. 70
Although there was no evidence of bribery, the judges
had routinely "fixed" or reduced fines on parking
tickets for friends and political affiliates. 71 Although the
Commission on Judicial Disabilities had only recommended that the judges be censured, the Court of
Appeals ordered that the judges be removed after
determining by "clear and convincing evidence" that
the judges were guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
proper administration of justice. 72
Although it is very difficult to mark the boundary
between conduct meriting removal and conduct meriting public censure, an examination of reported cases to
date suggests that there is a greater tendency to remove
a judge for criminal actions or conduct directly affecting
the performance of judicial duties, such as in the In re
Diener and Broccolino case. 73
In the second removal case, In re Bennett,74 a
district court judge was removed from office for having
forged a signature of another judge in order to change
the disposition of a traffic case at the request of a
political supporter. 75 The Commission had unanimously recommended that Judge Bennett be removed from
office. 76 In support of its decision to remove the judge,
the Court pointed out the number of violations of the

Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Rules of Judicial
Ethics with which the judge was charged. n

C. A Call for Reform: The Legislature and Judiciary
Respond to Public Criticism
Until fairly recently, Maryland's Judicial Disabilities Commission operated in near-obscurity insofar as
the public was concerned. But after one confirmed and
another controversial, supposed complaint, the Commission received unprecedented attention. Critics said
that the Commission was "underfunded, understaffed,
reluctant to punish and too packed with judges to render
impartial decisions. "78 Comparisons to other states
suggest that Maryland had, at one time, one of the least
busy judicial discipline commissions in the country,
according to the Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations. During the Commission's lifetime, only three
judges have been removed as a result of its investigations, all for fixing traffic tickets. 79 For example, in the
1992-93 fiscal year, Maryland's Commission received
thirty-four formal complaints, fewer than panels in
Nebraska or Alaska, whose populations are much smaller
than that of Maryland. In contrast, New York's panel
fielded 1,452 complaints. Of course, this may not
reflect relatively and fairly the complete workload or
paper flow of the Maryland Commission then or now:
As noted from the recollections of the past Chair of the
Commission, there were other matters that fell short of
a "formal complaint" that occupied the Commission.
As the old saw goes, it depends on "who is counting"
and "what is being counted."
Part of the new focus on the Commission is also
attributable to the fact that in recent years there has been
a heightened demand for public accountability on the
part of all public officials. This new demand on judges
can be attributed to the fact that courts are being drawn
into the economic and social life of the community to
deal with cases involving "complex and controversial
questions formerly left to other public and private
institutions to resolve. "80 This increase in "public law
litigation" has prompted a corresponding increase in
the demand for means to assure the judiciary's public
accountability.
In response to public criticism that Maryland's
Commission is "too secretive, slow and unwilling to
punish judicial misconduct," the General Assembly
passed a proposed constitutional amendment in the
1995 session that would restructure the Commission on

Judicial Disabilities by essentially adding four additional
lay persons to the commission. 81 The amendment goes
to the voters in 1996. 82 The proposed amendment
would expand the Commission ·to eleven members. 83
The Commission would then include three judges (one
each from the appellate court, the circuit court and the
district court, respectively), three attorneys, each of
whom must have been admitted to practice for at least
seven years (reduced from the current requirement of at
least fifteen years), and five lay individuals. Race,
gender, and geographic diversity are explicitly stated as
goals in the appointment of future members of the
Commission. 84 The amendment also limits the duration
of Commission membership to two, four-year terms. 85
No change is proposed in the powers and duties of the
Commission vis-a-vis the Court of Appeals.
Coincidentally for the most part and concurrent
with the processing of the legislature's proposal, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland's Standing Committee
on Rules ofPractice and Procedure sent to the Court of
Appeals a proposal for rule changes governing the
Commission, which does not require amending the
constitution. On May 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals
approved,86 with modest revisions, the Rules Committee's March 14, 1995 submission of new Rules 1227
through 1227G. The new rules took effect on July 1,
1995. Among the most important changes occasioned
by the new rules were: the creation of an Investigative
Counsel ("Counsel") position to investigate and prosecute charges of misconduct; a sixty day time limit for
the completion of preliminary investigations; and, a
provision that once formal charges of misconduct are
served upon a judge further proceedings in that matter
would not maintain their confidentiality.87
Of further note and unlike the predecessor rule, the
new rules define both "disability" and "sanctionable
conduct."88 The proposed rules define "disability" as
"a mental or physical disability that seriously interferes
with the performance of a judge's duties and is, or is
likely to become, permanent."89 Sanctionable misconduct includes:
misconduct while in office, the persistent failure by a judge to perform the
duties of the judge's office, or conduct
prejudicial to the proper administration
ofjustice. It inchides any conduct constituting a· violation of the Maryland·
26.2/ U. Bait. L.F. - 7 .

Code of Judicial Conduct . . .. An
erroneous ruling, finding, or decision in
a particular case does not alone constitute sanctionable conduct. 90
Under the new rules, the procedure for the Commission is as follows. All complaints are first directed to the
Investigative Counsel. The Counsel then opens a file on
each complaint received and promptly acknowledges
receipt of the complaint. 91 The new rule no longer
requires complaints to be notarized; instead, they need
only be verified under the penalties for petjury.92
Upon receiving a complaint, the Counsel decides
whether or not the complaint is "frivolous on its
face. "93 If the Counsel concludes that a complaint is
frivolous, the Counsel will dismiss the complaint and
notify the complainant, the Commission, .and, upon
request, the judge.94 If, however, the complaint is not
"frivolous on its face" the Counsel "shall conduct a
preliminary investigation to determine whether reasonable grounds exist to believe the allegations of the
complaint. "95 The preliminary investigation must be
completed within sixty days of receipt ofthe complaint.
The new rules also permit the Counsel to make inquiry
and undertake a preliminary investigation on his or her
own initiative, if the Counsel receives any information
from any source indicating that a judge has a disability
or has committed sanctionable conduct. 96
Whenever the Counsel undertakes a preliminary
investigation he or she is required to inform the Commission promptly that an investigation is underway. 97
Investigative Counsel, before the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation, is required to notify the judge
who is the focus of the investigation. 98 Specifically, the
Investigative Counsel must notify the judge of three
items: (1) whether the preliminary investigation was
undertaken on the Counsel's own initiative or on a
complaint; (2) the nature of the sanctionable conduct;
and (3) the name of the person who filed the complaint,
ifthe investigation was instituted by filing a complaint. 99
In addition, the judge may present to the Counsel any
information the judge may wish to present. 100
After the Counsel finishes the preliminary investigation, he or she reports the results to the Commission. At
this point, the Counsel will recommend one of the
following: that the complaint be dismissed; that the
judge be offered a private reprimand or deferred discipline agreement by the Commission; further investiga8 - U. Bait. L.F. /26.2

tion; or, that charges be filed against the judge and that
the Commission conduct a formal proceeding on the
charges.101 The new rules then detail the procedures for
each of these options. 102
l. Dismissal and Warning

Ifthe Commission opts to dismiss the complaint and
terminate the investigation, the judge must be notified.103 The Commission can, however, along with the
dismissal, issue a warning against future sanctionable
conduct. 104 The Commission could do this if it felt that
sanctionable conduct may have been committed by the
judge but is not likely to be repeated and was "not
sufficiently serious to warrant discipline."105 A Committee note to this rule clearly states that a "warning"
is not a reprimand and does not constitute discipline. 106
2. Private Reprimand

The rules provide that the Commission can issue a
private reprimand ifthe Commission concludes that the
judge has committed sanctionable conduct that warrants some form of discipline but concludes that "the
conduct was not so serious, offensive, or repeated to
warrant formal proceedings and that a private reprimand is the appropriate disposition under the circumstances."I07 Notably, the judge must waive his or her
rights to a hearing or to further challenge the findings
and agree that the reprimand shall not be protected by
confidentiality in any subsequent disciplinary proceeding.l08 After the reprimand is issued, the complainant
shall be notified. I09
3. Deferred Discipline Agreement

In addition to the reprimand, the new rules provide
a heretofore unavailable disciplinary mechanism called
a "deferred discipline agreement." I10 The Commission
may utilize this agreement if it finds that the alleged
sanctionable conduct was not so serious, offensive, or
repeated to warrant formal proceedings and that the
appropriate disposition is for the judge to undergo
treatment or educational training, issue an apology to
the complainant, or take other corrective action. III As
with the reprimand, the judge must waive all rights to a
hearing and agree that future confidentiality of this
agreement is not guaranteed. 112 The Counsel will then
monitor compliance with the conditions of the agreement. 113 In addition, the Commission can revoke the
agreement if it finds that the judge has failed to satisfy

a material condition of the agreement. 114 Before the
agreement is revoked, however, the judge will be given
an opportunity to respond. 115 Again, the Commission
must notify the complainant that the complaint has
resulted in an agreement with the judge, however,
unless the judge agrees, terms ofthe agreement shall not
be disclosed.11 6

4. Further Investigation
If the Commission approves further investigation,
the rules require that the judge receive notice that the
Commission has authorized the further investigation. 117
In addition, the judge may file a written response. At
this stage, the Commission may also authorize the
Counsel to issue a subpoena to compel the attendance
of witnesses or the production of documents. 118 Any
court files pertaining to any motion to compel compliance with a subpoena will be sealed. 119 The Commission
also has the power to grant immunity to any person who
testifies or produces evidence during the course of the
investigation. 120 Finally, the new rule states that this
"second" investigation shall be completed within sixty
days after it is authorized by the Commission. 121
5. Filing of Charges and Proceedings Before the
Commission
Formal proceedings before the Commission are
commenced when the Commission findsprobable cause
to believe that a judge has a disability or has committed
sanctionable misconduct. 122 A copy of the charge(s) is
mailed to the judge, and the charge(s) must state the
nature ofthe alleged disability, including each Canon of
Judicial Conduct allegedly violated by the judge, specify
the alleged facts upon which the charge(s) are based,
and state that the judge has the right to file a written
response. 123 The judge then has thirty days to respond
and has the right to inspect and copy all evidence
acquired during the investigation. 124 The Commission
can then proceed with a hearing, whether or not the
judge appears. Hearings are to be conducted in accordance with the Maryland Rules ofEvidence as provided
in the Maryland Administrative Procedures Act. 125 At
the hearing, the judge has the right to be represented by
counsel, present evidence, issue subpoenas for attendance of witnesses or production of documents, and
cross-examine witnesses. 126
If the Commission finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the judge has a disability or has committed

sanctionable misconduct, it must issue a public reprimand or refer the matter to the Court of Appeals;
otherwise the complaint shall be dismissed. 127 If the
Commission refers the case to the Court of Appeals, the
Commission must make written findings offact and give
its recommendations as to retirement or as to censure,
removal, or other appropriate discipline. After filing the
entire record with the Court, these findings must be
served upon the judge. 128 The Court of Appeals may
impose the sanction recommended by the Commission
or any other sanction permitted by law, dismiss the
proceeding, or remand for further proceedings. 129 The
Court's decision is evidenced by an appropriate order
and is accompanied by an opinion. 130
The new rules also clarify when proceedings before
the Commission are to be confidential. J3J Specifically,
upon service of charges alleging sanctionable misconduct, whether or not joined with charges of disability,
the charges and all subsequent proceedings before the
Commission on them shall be public. J32 If the charges
allege only that the judge has a disability, then the
charges and all subsequent proceedings will remain
confidential. 133 Any work product and deliberations of
the Commission not admitted into evidence will, however, remain confidential. Moreover, all records filed
with the Court of Appeals will be public, unless the
court orders otherwise. 134
III. THE CASE FOR ruDICIAL CONDUCT
ORGANIZATIONS
Controversy over the nature and scope of nonlegislative methods for judicial discipline stems from
differing views as to the "proper extent of judicial
independence."135 The concept of an independent
judiciary has always played a central position in this
country's history. Indeed, the establishment ofjudicial
conduct commissions was based in part on the idea that
respect for the judiciary would be increased if the
judicial system had the means to clean its own house. 136
Increasingly, however, critics of the judicial discipline
commissions argue that judges are no longer capable of
judging themselves. 137 In support of their assertions,
they point to evidence that shows diminished public
confidence in the judiciary. 138
History has demonstrated, however, that traditional
remedies to remove judges, including impeachment or
legislative address, have proved inadequate. 139 Thomas
26.2/ U. Bait. L.F. - 9

Jefferson described impeachment proceedings as a
"bungling way of removing judges-an impractical
way-a mere scarecrow."I40 Legislative remedies are
also particularly inappropriate to the enforcement of a
code of judicial conduct or to impose sanctions less
draconian than removal or suspension. The doctrine of
judicial discipline thus plays several important functions. In addition to guarding against unconstitutional
abuses by the legislative and executive branches, it
permits judges to enforce unpopular laws or protect
unpopular views without fear of reprisal from the
legislative or executive branches. Further restraints on
judicial behavior, beyond the legislative checks of impeachment, recall, or address, could create "timidity in
decisionmaking and impede a progressive approach to
the administration of justice. "141
Ultimately, the principle ofan independent judiciary
must remain foremost in any approach to judicial discipline. A well-versed critic of judicial discipline has
appropriately stated:

Jefferson also said, "[f]ew die and none resign."143
Therefore, it is necessary to have in place some method
of dealing efficiently and effectively with judicial misconduct and disability.l44
One of the most important purposes of the Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities is to maintain
the public's confidence in the judiciary. One of the
surest ways to "gain and maintain that confidence is to
demonstrate to the people that when judicial misconduct or disability does occur, there is a viable institution
that can cope with it ... with scrupulous impartiality."145 The ABA has said in its Standards Relating to
Judicial Discipline and Disability Retirement, the purpose of the discipline systems is not to punish judges,
but to maintain public confidence in the judiciary,
preserve the integrity of the judicial process and create
greater awareness of proper judicial behavior on the
part of judges themselves. 146
Although public attention to the problem ofjudicial
disability focuses upon the more sensational or scandalous cases of misconduct, the usual case is less dramatic
and less serious-habitual tardiness, short work hours,
A judicial system operating within the
long vacations, and extreme rudeness to lawyers, litijudicial branch is better adapted to the
gants, and witnesses. 147 As the California Commission
fair, expeditious, and comparatively inon Judicial Qualifications explained in its 1963 report to
expensive disposition of all types of
the Governor, among the ten judges who had resigned
misconduct allegations. Not only can a
or retired that year during investigation by the Commisjudicial tribunal best ensure that the
sion, "'the most common difficulties' were' [d]isabling
accused is afforded the due process of
illness with incapacity to perform judicial duties' and
law, but there is every reason to believe
'weakening of mental faculties connected with adthat the judiciary itself is deeply con- ,
vanced age and reflected in unacceptable derelictions in
cerned with maintaining the highest
court. "'148 Several years later the California Commispossible standards of conduct within its
own ranks. 142
sion stated that '" [0 ]ver the years the principal factor
leading to ... retirement or resignation has been poor
A lazy judge or one who shows significant signs of health preventing the proper performance of judicial
physical or mental impairment will rarely be able to duties. "'149
handle a full caseload, and if he or she cannot perform
their judicial functions, he or she can hardly promote, in IV. THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
litigants or the public, that confidence.in the judiciary COMMISSIONS
necessary for its continuing effectiveness. Similarly
In order to obtain and maintain public confidence in
troublesome is the judge who engages in questionable
the
disciplinary system, visible participation by nonpractices or is guilty of minor or major offenses. The
more complicated the mechanisms for discipliningjudges judges is crucial. An institutional structure involving
or terminating judicial tenure, the more difficult it is to participation by lawyers and non-lawyers at some level
deal with these problems. Given the fallibility of human of the disciplinary process is necessary if the system is
nature, we shall always have judges who misbehave or to be credible in the eyes of the public. Unfortunately,
who, having become mentally or physically disabled, do because the public cannot respect a disciplinary system
not have the grace to retire voluntarily from office. As it cannot see, an inevitable tension will remain between
10 - U. Bait. L.F. 126.2

the needs for visibility and confidentiality. 150 As Edmund
Burke observed, "Where mystery begins, justice ends."
Confidentiality is necessary nonetheless, particularly at
the investigatory stage, to protect the judge's reputation against frivolous and unfounded charges and to
protect persons who make complaints against reprisal.
In addition, confidentiality insures that members ofthe
Commission may speak candidly and forthrightly among
themselves.
Ultimately, a balance must be struck between the
need for confidentiality and the need for credibility. The
disciplinary process must have an appropriate degree of
visibility. The public must be assured that ethical
standards are uniformly and evenly enforced and judges
must develop a heightened awareness ofwhat is expected ofthem. An informal reprimand may correct fault in
a single judge, but "it will not enlighten his or her
brethren about what is required of them and it does
nothing to promote the credibility of the disciplinary
system."151
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JUDGE BASIL A. THOMAS
INTERNATIONAL LAW LIBRARY
A fund honoring Judge Basil A. Thomas has been created to support an
International Law Library in the University of Baltimore Law Library.
Your contributions to assist in the establishment of this library are most welcome.
Make checks payable to: University of Baltimore Educational Fund
Please send to:
Judge Basil A. Thomas Law Library
University of Baltimore Educational Fund
1304 St. Paul Street, Baltimore Maryland 21202-2789

Gifts to the Judge Basil A. Thomas Law Library are
tax deductible as allowed by law.

Baltimore City derived its name from the Proprietary's Irish Barony.
The City was incorporated in 1796 (Chapter 68,4cts of 1796) and its
governmental structure separated from Baltimore County in 1851.
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